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Abstract:  
We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices 
and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous 
variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the 
learning setup with the model set up but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices 
are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky 
prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. 
Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent 
from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and 
non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model 
may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions 
equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different 
stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests to analyze 
learning in stochastic models. 
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Monetary macroeconomic models often suﬀer from multiplicity of rational expecta-
tions equilibria. Overlapping generations (OLG) models with money are perhaps the
best-known example where rational expectations do not lead to a unique equilibrium
prediction. Typically OLG models possess both a determinate monetary steady state
and a continuum of paths converging to the indeterminate non-monetary steady state.1
To sharpen the predictions of rational expectations it is - by now - common practice
in the literature to study the stability of equilibria under adaptive learning schemes
(Marcet and Sargent (1989a), Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). Consistent with exper-
imental evidence, e.g. Marimon and Sunder (1993), equilibria whose expectations can
be acquired via simple learning rules are widely believed to constitute more plausible
model predictions than equilibria that would require more sophisticated coordination
devices.
Surprisingly, the stability properties of rational expectations equilibria in monetary
overlapping generations models is still an open issue. More precisely, the literature
suggests that the stability properties of rational expectations equilibria depend on the
information set available to agents and in particular on whether agents use current or
lagged prices to update their in￿ation expectations.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nl e a r n i n gi nO L Gm o d e l sh a sf o rt h em o s tp a r ta s s u m e dt h a ta g e n t s
use only lagged prices to update in￿ation expectations. With this assumption it seems
to be a robust ￿nding that the determinate monetary steady state is the only stable
equilibrium under adaptive, least-squares, or related learning schemes. This was ￿rst
argued by Marcet and Sargent (1989b). Arifovic (1995) showed the result for genetic
algorithm learning, and Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001) for heterogenous
learning rules.
However, a number of recent papers ￿nd that stability properties can be reversed
once agents use current period variables to update expectations (Duﬀy (1994), Evans
and Honkapohja (2001, section 3.4), Bullard and Mitra (2002)). In particular, Van
Zandt and Lettau (2002) have shown that use of current prices in an OLG model can
result in instability of the determinate and stability of the indeterminate steady state.
1There may also exist equilibrium cycles and sunspot equilibria, which have been analyzed by
Grandmont (1985) and Woodford (1990), respectively.
1It is important to allow agents to use current prices to update expectations to
insure that the information structure for the learning setup is consistent with that of
the model. Since agents in OLG models choose the real value of money balances, they
necessarily know current prices at the time they make their money demand decisions.
Real money demand, however, depends on expected in￿ation and it seems unlikely that
agents would not use the same price information to update their in￿ation expectations.
This has not been recognized before.
These arguments suggest that stability of the determinate monetary steady state,
as found for the case of lagged price information, may rest upon an inconsistent in-
formational setup. However, the results of Van Zandt and Lettau (2002) for the case
of current price information are diﬃcult to interpret. Agents￿ use of current prices in-
troduces simultaneity between prices and expectations and thereby typically generates
multiple market clearing price-expectations pairs. This multiplicity requires auxiliary
selection assumptions to be able to construct the learning dynamics, as explained fur-
ther in section 2, and causes diﬃculties in understanding the precise source of the
stability reversal.
The main objective of this paper is to resolve the issue of stability of rational
expectations equilibria under adaptive learning in monetary overlapping generations
models when agents can condition expectations on current prices. To do so it is pro-
posed to consider the competitive limit of a model with sticky prices and monopolistic
competition instead of the customary competitive model with ￿exible prices.
Sticky prices are essential to improve upon the shortcomings of previous selection
attempts. When prices are sticky agents can use theses prices to update their expecta-
tions without creating simultaneity between these variables. Sticky prices thereby allow
for an informationally consistent setup but avoid multiplicity of temporary equilibria.
The introduction of sticky prices is also of interest in its own because sticky prices
are widely believed to be an important ingredient of empirically plausible macroeco-
nomic models (e.g. Gal￿ and Gertler (1999)). Yet, their implications for equilibrium
selection have not been analyzed so far.
Besides extending the stability analysis to the case of sticky prices, the paper also
analyzes stability of (non-stationary) equilibria near the steady states, which have
not been studied previously, and clari￿es the relationship between learning in non-
stochastic and stochastic versions of the model.
In summary, the results are the following. Most importantly, adaptive learning
2schemes robustly select the same equilibrium independent of the degree of imperfect
competition. Furthermore, the determinate monetary steady state is the only learnable
equilibrium.2 This con￿rms the early ￿ndings of Marcet and Sargent (1989b) and
suggests that equilibrium selection in monetary OLG models does not depend on the
agents￿ information set.
The results are derived in several steps. The paper ￿rst analyzes a deterministic
model and studies the learnability of the monetary and non-monetary steady states un-
der constant and decreasing gain learning rules. While the indeterminate non-monetary
steady state is always unstable, the determinate monetary steady state is locally stable
if the elasticity of labor supply is larger than one-half but unstable otherwise.
The paper then analyzes least squares learning in a stochastic environment and
shows that the (stochastic) low in￿ation steady state is always locally stable indepen-
dently of the labor supply elasticity. The indeterminate high in￿ation steady state and
the non-stationary equilibria are always unstable under least-squares learning.
Although the deterministic model suggests that the elasticity of labor supply has an
important impact on the stability of the monetary steady state, the stochastic model
shows that its role arises only due to a singularity in the transition from a stochastic
to a deterministic environment.
In particular, I ￿nd that the perfect foresight solution of the deterministic econ-
omy is of a simpler structure than the rational expectations solution in the stochastic
economy even as the support of the noise becomes arbitrarily small.3 This implies that
agents in a stochastic environment must learn a diﬀerent equilibrium law of motion to
acquire rational expectations, which leads to diﬀerent stability conditions.
The elasticity condition of the deterministic setup is found to correspond to the
stability condition of a ￿restricted perceptions equilibrium￿ in the stochastic economy
where agents underparameterize the economy￿s law of motion. Thus, the perfect fore-
sight equilibrium of the deterministic model can be interpreted as the limit of a re-
stricted perceptions equilibrium of the stochastic model with vanishing noise.
This suggests to analyze learning in stochastic models and complements the argu-
ment in favor of stochastic models made by Evans and Honkapohja (1998) who showed
2Some quali￿cations apply as described later in the introduction.
3The equilibrium laws of motion diﬀer because in a deterministic equilibrium some variables settle
down to constant values while they keep on ￿uctuating in the stochastic equilibrium, which requires
that agents condition their forecasts permanently on these variables.
3that discontinuities can arise because some of the serial correlation properties of the
data may disappear when shocks have zero variance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿y shows how learning leads to
multiple market clearing prices in ￿exible price models when agents￿ expectations de-
pend on current prices and how sticky prices help to avoid this problem. Section 3
then introduces the OLG model with sticky prices and imperfect competition. The
model￿s perfect foresight equilibria are determined in section 4 where it is also shown
that these equilibria approach the ones of the ￿exible price model as the degree of
imperfect competition vanishes. Section 5 analyzes learning in the deterministic model
and section 6 considers a stochastic version of the model. Most technical details and
proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 The Multiplicity Problem
As argued in the introduction, an informationally consistent setup requires that learn-
ing agents can use current prices to update their in￿ation expectations. This section
shows that use of current prices easily leads to multiple market clearing prices and
prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. It is also shown how
sticky prices can be used to overcome the problem.
To illustrate the potential for multiplicity I assume simple money demand and
supply functions and an equally simple learning rule. Let real money demand be given
by
m
d
t = a − b • Π
e
t+1 a>b>0 (1)
where Πe
t+1 denotes current expectations of the future in￿ation factor. Money demand
f u n c t i o n so ft h i sf o r mc a nb ed e r i v e df r o m OLG models with money and also feature
prominently in monetary models (Cagan (1956), Sargent and Wallace (1987)).
Furthermore, let real money supply be given by
m
s
t =
λmt−1
Πt
+ g (2)
where λ > 0 denotes the nominal money growth factor, g ≥ 0 the amount of real
seignorage, mt−1 the previous period￿s stock of real balances, and Πt the in￿ation
factor. The supply rule nests nominal money growth rules and real seignorage rules
and is a (hyperbolically) decreasing function of current in￿ation.
4In models with learning, the expectations in the demand function (1) are determined
through an explicit updating mechanism. Consider the following rule which has been
widely used in the literature:
Π
e
t+1 = Π
e
t + γ(Πt − Π
e
t) (3)
The parameter γ > 0 determines how fast expectations are updated in response to
past forecast errors. Note that agents use current in￿ation to update, as required
for an informationally consistent setup. As a result, current in￿ation aﬀects current
expectations and money demand will decrease (linearly) with current in￿ation.
Figure 1 depicts money demand and supply when expectations are given by learning
rule (3). The ￿gure shows that market clearing prices are generically non-unique, given
they exist.4
Multiplicities, as the one illustrated in ￿gure 1, create problems for constructing
the dynamics of prices and beliefs under learning since they require to select between
diﬀerent market clearing prices. Such a selection is not innocent because it aﬀects
current expectations and, via the learning rule, the whole path of future prices. It is
then diﬃcult to understand whether the learning rule or the temporary equilibrium
selection ultimately drives the stability properties of equilibria.
To avoid the multiplicity problem Grandmont (1985) has added a restriction on the
expectations functions in his analysis of the standard OLG model. However, this re-
striction does not hold for learning rule (3) and the remaining learning rules considered
in this paper.
Instead of restricting the learning rule, I propose to introduce sticky prices in the
form of monopolistically-competitive entrepreneurs who set prices one period in ad-
vance. If entrepreneurs do not know the current price level at the time they set their
own prices, then their expectations are determined by history and the price setting
problem has a unique solution. Once prices are predetermined, expectations enter-
ing the money demand function can safely depend on current prices without creating
4Existence is guaranteed for all γ > 0 when g>0 is not too large, λ not too diﬀerent from 1, and
1 < Πe
t < a
b. This follows from the fact that at Πt = Πe
t: ms
t ≈
mt−1
Πe
t <m d
t = mt−1where the equality
follows from the learning rule (3) and market clearing in t-1.
5mt
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Figure 1: Money Market Clearing
multiplicity.5 The construction of learning dynamics is then straightforward.
Although sticky prices insure uniqueness of temporary equilibria under learning
they do not insure uniqueness when expectations are rational. In rational expectations
equilibrium current prices are functions of entrepreneurs￿ information set and these
functions are known. Therefore, sticky price models suﬀers from the same kind of
indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibria as ￿exible price models. This has the
a d v a n t a g et h a tr e s u l t sf o rt h es t i c k yp r i c em o d e lr e m a i ne a s i l yc o m p a r a b l ew i t ht h e
￿exible price setup.
3A n O L G M o d e l w i t h S t i c k y P r i c e s
I consider a simple overlapping generations model with production where each gener-
a t i o no fa g e n t sl i v e sf o rt w op e r i o d s-w o r k sw h e ny o u n ga n dc o n s u m e sw h e no l d -a n d
may transfer wealth across time via ￿a tm o n e y .T h e r ei sa l s oa ni n ￿nitely lived gov-
ernment that ￿nances a constant real de￿cit through seignorage. This setup generates
an environment closely related to the seignorage model of Sargent and Wallace (1987).
In each time period a new generation of agents is born. In contrast to standard
models agents of a given generation are either born as workers or entrepreneurs with a
5Since prices are preset (money and labor) markets will be cleared by the real wage. Provided
money demand is monotone in real wages, there is a unique market clearing real wage. Real wages
do not show up in the money demand function of the ￿exible price economy because we assume a
production technology that is linear in labor, which implies that real wages are constant.
6unit mass of each of them in every new generation.6
Workers are homogeneous and oﬀer their labor force at a competitive labor market
in return for a wage income.
Entrepreneurs are in monopolistic competition with each entrepreneur i ∈ [0,1]
producing a good qi which is an imperfect substitute in the production of the aggregate
consumption good c (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)):
c =



Z
i∈[0,1]
¡
q
i¢1−σ



1
1−σ
with 1 > σ ≥ 0
With σ =0goods are perfect substitutes and entrepreneurs are in perfect competi-
tion. When σ > 0 goods are imperfectly substitutable and entrepreneurs will earn
monopolistic rents.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period, young en-
trepreneurs commit to a price at which they are willing to sell the product. Then old
agents, i.e. old workers and old entrepreneurs, spend all their money holdings to order
goods. At the same time, the government orders goods for government consumption.
Firms accept any amount of orders at the price they posted and then hire the work
force that is necessary to produce the ordered quantities. The labor market clears and
production takes place. Young workers are paid their wage, young entrepreneurs retain
their pro￿ts, and the produced goods are delivered for consumption to the old agents
and the government. Then a new period starts.
Let Pi
t denote the price posted for good i at the beginning of period t and Pt the
Dixit-Stiglitz price index.7 Furthermore, let Mt denote the stock of nominal money at
the end of period t. The real value of outstanding money balances mt = Mt
Pt evolves
according to
mt =
mt−1
Πt
+ g (4)
where Πt = Pt
Pt−1 is the in￿ation factor from t−1 to t,a n dg ≥ 0 denotes real seignorage
revenue raised for government consumption.8
6Any numbers could be chosen as long as they are constant through time.
7We have Pt =
‡R
[0,1]
¡
Pi
t
¢ σ−1
σ di
· σ
σ−1
.
8Government consumption is assumed to be either wasteful or to generate utility that is separable
from that of private consumption and leisure.
73.1 Workers
The representative worker who is born in period t maximizes
max
nt,cw
t+1
E
∗
t
£
−v(nt)+u(c
w
t+1)
⁄
subject to
m
w
t = ntwt (5)
c
w
t+1 ≤
mw
t
Πt+1
where nt denotes hours of work, cw
t+1 consumption in t +1 , wt the real wage (in terms
of period t consumption), and mw
t the worker￿s end of period t real money holdings.
Utility functions are assumed strictly concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Note that workers maximize utility with respect to some (potentially) subjective
expectations operator E∗
t that is based on the information set
Ht = σ(Pt,Pt−1,...;mt,m t−1,...)
which contains past and current values of prices and real balances. Workers￿ expecta-
tions therefore depend on current prices, as required for an informationally consistent
setup.
The ￿rst order conditions of the utility maximization problem implicitly de￿ne the
workers￿ labor supply as a function of the current real wage and expected in￿ation:
n(wt,E
∗
t(Πt+1)) (6)
Alternatively, the ￿rst order conditions de￿ne a real wage function
w(nt,E
∗
t(Πt+1)) (7)
that determines the real wage that has to be paid to induce the representative worker
to supply nt units of labor when her in￿ation expectations are given by E∗
t(Πt+1).T h e
real wage function is continuously diﬀerentiable for E∗
t(Πt+1) > 0 at all feasible levels
nt.
The labor supply function (6), or the real wage function (7), summarizes workers￿
optimal economic decisions. To insure that real money demand is downward sloping in
expected in￿ation and to insure the existence of a monetary and a non-monetary steady
state for small enough levels of government seignorage, one can impose the following
conditions on the labor supply function (6):
8Condition 1 1. Labor supply increases in wt and decreases in Πe
t+1
2. Labor supply is positive when both wt =1− σ and Πe
t+1 =1
3. Labor supply is zero when wt =1−σ for some Πe
t+1 < ∞,w h e r eΠ∗ < ∞ denotes
the lowest in￿ation rate (the in￿mum) for which this is the case.
As u ﬃcient condition for the ￿rst requirement to hold is that the coeﬃcient of rela-
tive risk aversion of the utility function u(•) is larger than one such that the substitution
eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect. The second and third requirement hold whenever
v0(0) <u 0(0) < ∞, i.e. whenever the marginal utility of consumption is suﬃciently
high but bounded.
3.2 Entrepreneurs
At the beginning of each time period young entrepreneurs simultaneously decide about
their prices. Pro￿t maximization by the competitive sector implies that the demand
curve faced by entrepreneur j is given by
q
j
t = mt
￿
Pt
P
j
t
¶ 1
σ
(8)
With the production technology being linear in labor, each entrepreneur j maximizes
max
P
j
t
E
∗
t−1
"
mt
￿
Pt
P
j
t
¶ 1
σ £
P
j
t − Ptwt
⁄
#
(9)
Note that entrepreneurs maximize with respect to some (potentially) subjective expec-
tations operator E∗
t−1 which is based on an information set that does not contain time
t variables.
The ￿rst order condition of (9) determines the pro￿t maximizing price:
P
j
t =
1
1 − σ
Pt−1E
∗
t−1(Πtwt) (10)
As usual, optimal prices are a mark-up over expected marginal costs where the mark-up
factor depends on the degree of imperfect competition σ. Equation (10) summarizes
pro￿t maximization behavior of entrepreneurs.
93.3 The Role of Subjective Expectations
The behavior of workers, entrepreneurs, and the government can be summarized by
equations (7), (10), and (4), respectively. When expectations are potentially non-
rational, as in the setup of this model, the nature of the non-rationality may determine
how these equations can be combined with each other.
For example, when entrepreneurs￿ wage expectations in equation (10) are incon-
sistent with their in￿ation expectations, then it would not be possible to use the real
wage function (7) to express wage expectations as a function of the expected in￿ation
path.9 To insure that the model equations can be used as it is the case when ex-
pectations are objectively rational, I have to impose restrictions on agent￿s subjective
expectations. These restrictions are in several ways quite strong, though of course the
standard ￿rational expectations￿ makes even stronger assumptions.
Firstly, it is assumed that entrepreneurs and workers hold the same in￿ation expec-
tations whenever they are given the same information set.10 Secondly, entrepreneurs￿
forecasts of future wages and in￿ation rates are assumed to be always consistent with
the model structure, in particular with workers￿ labor supply function and the econ-
omy￿s production function. Thirdly, expectations are supposed to obey the law of
iterated expectations, i.e. E∗
t−1 [E∗
t [•]] = E∗
t−1 [•], which says that agents expect their
forecasts to be unbiased as they do not expect forecasts to move in predictable ways
as time proceeds. Finally, expectations are point expectations.11
Using the previous assumptions one can express entrepreneurs￿ wage expectations
as a function of expected future in￿ation rates and known variables, even when expec-
tations are potentially non-rational. With equation (7) entrepreneurs￿ wage forecasts
are then given by
E
∗
t−1 [wt]=w(E
∗
t−1 [nt],E
∗
t−1 [Πt+1]) (11)
9Inconsistent means that entrepreneurs expect a diﬀerent wage than the one implied by the model
if their in￿ation expectations were to become true.
10Heterogeneous expectations in a monetary hyperin￿ation model have been studied in Evans,
Honkapohja and Marimon (2001).
11Expectations can also be interpreted as mean expectations once I consider the linearized version
of the model.
10From the linearity of the production function and equation (8) follows that labor de-
mand nt can be expressed as
nt =
Z
q
i
tdi = mt (Pt)
1
σ
•Z ¡
P
i
t
¢− 1
σ di
‚
= mt (12)
where the last equality follows from the fact that entrepreneurs set identical prices
because they hold identical expectations. Combining this result with equations (4)
and (11) delivers
E
∗
t−1 [wt]=w
￿
mt−1
E∗
t−1 [Πt]
+ g,E
∗
t−1 [Πt+1]
¶
(13)
Expected real wages are now a function of known variables and expected future in￿ation
rates. By equation (10) the same holds for pro￿t maximizing prices.
Using result (13) all relevant equations, i.e. (4), (7), and (10), now involve only
in￿ation expectations. Therefore, as is the case with the ￿exible price economy, a single
learning rule for in￿ation expectations is suﬃcient to analyze the model￿s learning
dynamics.
4 Perfect Foresight Equilibria
This section characterizes the model￿s perfect foresight equilibria (PFE) and shows
that the equilibria of the sticky price economy approach the ones of the ￿exible price
economy as the degree of imperfect competition σ vanishes.
Equation (10) together with the fact that all ￿rms charge the same price implies
that current in￿ation can be expressed as
Πt =
1
1 − σ
Et−1[Πtwt] (14)
Under perfect foresight Πt is part of the t − 1 information set. Therefore, the price
setting equation only determines the equilibrium real wage but not the current price
level, i.e.
wt =1− σ (15)
When combining this with equations (4) and (12) one obtains a single equation char-
acterizing PFE:
n(1 − σ,Πt+1)=
n(1 − σ,Πt)
Πt
+ g (16)
11 
1 + Π t
l Π
h Π
1 + Π = Π t t
t Π
Figure 2: Perfect Foresight Paths
PFE can be generated by choosing an initial in￿ation rate Π0 and iterating equation
(16) forward. Figure 2 depicts the map from Πt to Πt+1 implied by equation (16) when
the level of government seignorage is given by g =0 .
Condition 1 guarantees existence of two steady states. There is a low in￿ation
steady state (Πl,m l) where money is valued and in￿ation is equal to zero
Π
l =1 and m
l = n(1 − σ,Π
l) > 0
and a high in￿ation steady state (Πh,m h) where money is not valued:12
Π
h = Π
∗ and m
h = n(1 − σ,Π
h)=0
Since
∂Πh(g)
∂g < 0 at g =0money starts to become valued in the high in￿ation steady
state for small positive levels of seignorage g.
When applying the implicit function theorem to equation (16), one ￿nds that
dΠt+1
dΠt > 1 at the low in￿ation steady state and
dΠt+1
dΠt < 1 at the high in￿ation steady
state, which generates the graph depicted in ￿gure 2. It implies that there exist ini-
tially non-stationary PFE where in￿ation asymptotically approaches Πh, as illustrated
in the ￿gure.
12The ￿in￿ation rate￿ Π∗ reported for this steady state is the limit of the in￿ation rates as g → 0.
12Now consider the relation to the PFE in the ￿exible price economy. In a ￿exible price
economy PFE are characterized by an equation similar to (16) but with the equilibrium
real wage given by wt =1 , which follows from the linearity of the production function.
Since n(•,•) is continuously diﬀerentiable and since the in￿ation rates in a PFE must
lie in the bounded interval [0,Πh], the PFE of the sticky price economy approach the
ones of the ￿exible price economy as the degree of imperfect competition σ approaches
zero.13
5 Stability of Steady States under Adaptive Learn-
ing
This section analyzes the stability of the steady state equilibria under adaptive learning
schemes. The analysis of non-stationary equilibria is deferred to section 6.
Assume agents forecast future in￿ation rates according to the following adaptive
rule:
tΠ
e
t+1 = t−1Π
e
t + γt(Πt − t−1Π
e
t) (17)
Left-hand side subscripts denote the time at which expectations are formed and right-
hand side subscripts the date for which the indexed variable is forecasted. Rule (17)
says that the new in￿ation forecast is equal to the previous forecast plus γt times the
latest forecast error, which is given by the term in the brackets. Note that the current
in￿ation rate Πt enters into the forecast made at time t, as required.
The gain parameter γt ∈ (0,1) determines how fast expectations adapt in response
to forecast errors. Two kinds of gain sequences will be considered: constant gain
learning rules where γt = γ and decreasing gain learning rules where γt → 0 with
P
γt = ∞. The motivation for considering constant and decreasing gain rules is that
V a nZ a n d ta n dL e t t a u( 2 0 0 2 )h a v er e p o r t e dt h a ts t a b i l i t ym a yd e p e n do nw h i c hk i n d
of gain sequence is chosen.
An alternative way to express learning and forecasting rule (17) is to say that agents
13More precisely: for any initial value Π0 let Πσ
t denote the path of in￿ation generated by iterating
(16) forward with wt =1− σ, then for any ε > 0 there exists a σ > 0 such that for all Π0 :
supt
ﬂ ﬂΠσ
t − Π0
t
ﬂ ﬂ < ε.
13perceive the in￿ation process to be given by
Πt = a + εt (18)
where a is the (unknown) steady state in￿ation rate and εt a white noise shock. Equa-
tion (18) is usually referred to as agents￿ Perceived Law of Motion (PLM). Equation
(17) then implies that agents estimate the parameter a according to
b at =
Pt−1
j=0
‡‡Qj−1
i=0(1 − γt−i)
·
γt−jΠt−j
·
(19)
and predict by
tΠ
e
t+1 = b at (20)
When γt = 1
t then b at is the least squares estimate of a, i.e. the average of past in￿ation
rates. For γt = γ < 1, b at is an exponentially distributed weighted average of past
in￿ation rates.
Entrepreneurs also require two period forecasts of in￿ation. These forecasts can
be obtained by applying the law of iterated expectations to equation (17).14 Writing
equation (17) for t+1Πe
t+2 and taking time t expectations on both sides results in
tΠ
e
t+2 = tΠ
e
t+1 (21)
which says that forecasts for the far future are identical to forecasts for the near fu-
t u r e . T h i sf o l l o w sf o r mt h ef a c tt h a ta g e n t sp e r c e i v ei n ￿ation to ￿uctuate around a
steady state and believe that their forecast for the near future incorporates all available
information.
5.1 The General (In-)Stability Result
This section characterizes the conditions for which the economy converges to a steady
state when agents learn as outlined in the previous section.
To derive the result I must impose some regularity conditions, which are summarized
as condition 2 in appendix 8.1. Condition 2 insures that various matrices are of full
rank and that their eigenvectors do not lie right on the unit circle.
The following proposition states the main result of this section:
14The same result is obtained when using equations (18) and (20) instead.
14Proposition 1 Consider a steady state (Π,m) and assume condition 1 and regularity
condition 2 hold. Let wi denote the derivative of the real wage function (7) with respect
to its i-th argument evaluated at (Π,m).I fa tt h es t e a d ys t a t e
w2
1 − σ
(Π − 1) <
w1
1 − σ
m
Π
< Π +1 (22)
then there exists a γ > 0 such that the steady state is locally asymptotically stable
1. for all constant gain learning rules with adaptation rates 0 < γ < γ.
2. for all decreasing gain learning rules.
If (22) does not hold, then there exists a γ > 0 such that the steady state is unstable
1. for all constant gain learning rules with adaptation rates 0 < γ < γ.
2. for all decreasing gain learning rules.
The proof can be found in appendix 8.2. It is straightforward for the constant gain
learning rule but more involved for the decreasing gain rule where one has to consider
a non-autonomous diﬀerence equation. The proof is further complicated by the fact
that one of the eigenvalues converges to 1 as γt converges to zero.
Condition (22), which determines the stability properties, has an immediate eco-
nomic interpretation in terms of the stability of the steady state with respect to devia-
tions of real money balances and in￿ation expectations from their steady state values.
First, consider demand deviations. The term in the middle of equation (22) is the
elasticity of the in￿ation rate with respect to the t−1 money stock mt−1,s e ee q u a t i o n s
(13) and (14). Since w1 > 0 it follows that in￿ation rises in response to positive
demand shocks, which should stabilize the economy because increased in￿ation helps
devaluating excessive money balances and thereby pushes the economy back towards
the steady state. Yet, if the in￿ation reaction is too strong then a deviation of money
in one direction is followed by an even larger deviation in the opposite direction and
the system starts to oscillate with increasing amplitude around the equilibrium. The
t e r mo nt h ev e r yr i g h to f( 2 2 )i st h eb o u n do nt h ee l a s t i c i t yt h a tp r e v e n t st h i sf r o m
happening.
15Next, consider deviations of in￿ation expectations from steady state in￿ation and
the following inequality
w2 <w 1
m
Π2 (23)
which is a suﬃcient condition for the inequality on the left-hand side of (22) to hold.
A positive shock to agents￿ in￿ation expectations has two opposing eﬀects on in￿ation
which are captured by the two sides of inequality (23).
Firstly, ￿rms anticipate lower product demand because in￿ation devaluates old
agents￿ real money balances. This causes a fall in expected labor demand and expected
wages and thereby puts downward pressure on in￿ation. This move down the labor
supply function is captured by the term on the right of (23), which is the derivative
of the real wage with respect to labor demand times the derivative of real money mt
(which is identical to labor demand nt)w i t hr e s p e c tt oΠt.
Secondly, higher expected in￿ation taxes move the labor supply schedule upwards
because workers have to be compensated with a higher real wage to oﬀer any given
amount of labor. This eﬀect puts upward pressure on in￿ation and is captured by the
term on the left of (23).
If the ￿rst eﬀect dominates, then real wages will decrease in response to an increase
in in￿ation expectations. The price setting equation (14) then implies that realized
in￿ation will be lower than expected in￿a t i o n .F r o mt h el e a r n i n gr u l ei tt h e nf o l l o w s
that in￿ation expectations will return over time to the steady state value.15
5.2 Learning the High In￿ation Steady State
This section applies proposition 1 to study the stability of the high in￿ation steady
state under adaptive learning. The main result is
Corollary 1 For government expenditures g close enough to zero, condition (22) never
holds for the high-in￿ation steady state.
Proof: By contradiction suppose that the left-hand side of (22) holds. This requires
w2Π
2 − w2Π − w1m<0
15When equation (23) does not hold then the steady state is not necessarily unstable, see equation
(22), since current expectations in￿uence also future expectations and the expected future money
stocks. This channel has been ignored in the previous argument and is captured by the additional
term on the left of equation (22).
16With w2 > 0, a necessary condition for this is
Π <
1
2
+
r
1
4
+
w1
w2
m
As g → 0, Π → Πh and m → 0 .S i n c ew2 > 0 and w1 > 0 at (Π,m)=( Πh,0),
this condition boils down to Π < 1, which contradicts Πh > 1.¥
As in Marcet and Sargent (1989a), where ag e n t sc o u l du s eo n l yl a g g e dp r i c e st o
update expectations, the high in￿ation steady state is unstable. This holds independent
of the degree of imperfect competition σ.
It is rather surprising that sticky prices do not aﬀect the stability properties because
even for σ ≈ 0 the learning dynamics in a ￿exible price model and a sticky price
model diﬀer considerably: with ￿exible prices in￿ation always adjusts to bring the
money market into equilibrium; with sticky prices in￿ation is chosen by entrepreneurs.
Their choice brings the money market into equilibrium only if their expectations are
correct. Outside the rational expectations equilibrium the real wage adjusts to insure
the (temporary) market equilibrium. Therefore, in￿ation dynamics outside equilibrium
diﬀer even though the equilibrium dynamics of the two models are (almost) identical
for small σ.
5.3 Learning the Low In￿ation Steady State
Applying proposition 1 to the low in￿ation steady state delivers:
Corollary 2 For government expenditures g close enough to zero, the stability condi-
tion (22) holds at the low in￿ation steady state if and only if
εn,w >
1
2
(24)
where εn,w is the real wage elasticity of labor supply at the steady state.
Proof: A l lt h et e r m si n( 2 2 )a r ec o n t i n u o u si ng. Therefore, when (22) holds for g =0 ,
it will also hold for suﬃciently small but positive g.A tg =0 , one has Π =1and
m = n(1−σ,1) > 0. For these values 1+Π
Π =2and w2
1−σ
Π−1
Π =0 .S i n c ew1 > 0 and
m>0, the inequality in the left of (22) holds. Since w =1−σ in equilibrium, the
t e r mi nt h em i d d l eo f( 2 2 )i se q u a lt oεw,n = 1
εn,w, which establishes the claim.¥
17For a suﬃciently elastic labor supply the low in￿ation steady state is stable. Again
this holds independent of the degree of imperfect competition. If labor supply is too
inelastic (εn,w < 1
2)t h e ni n ￿ation reacts strongly to demand deviations because ￿rms
predict a strong reaction in real wages. The strong in￿ation reaction leads to demand
deviations of the opposite sign in the next period and generates the oscillating behavior
described in section 5.1.
The result of corollary 2 diﬀers notably from that in Marcet and Sargent (1989b)
who found the low in￿ation steady state to be stable independent of the labor supply
elasticity. One might be tempted to conclude that it is the diﬀerent learning dynamics
of the sticky price and ￿exible price economy that ultimately matter for this diﬀerence
in stability: in a ￿exible price model real production costs remain unaﬀected by nominal
demand conditions.
Yet, it is also possible that the role of the labor supply elasticity in the sticky price
model arises only due to a singularity in the transition from a stochastic to a deter-
ministic model: In a deterministic economy steady state money balances are constant
which implies that a simple perceived law of motion of the form (18) is suﬃcient to
acquire rational expectations. If, however, the money creation process contained a ran-
dom component, then money balances would permanently ￿uctuate and, due to the
price stickiness, in￿ation would react with some lag. Consequently, agents would have
to condition forecasts on lagged money to learn to predict in￿ation rationally. This
may well alter the stability property of the equilibrium.
Therefore, the next section studies an economy with stochastic demand shocks.
6 A stochastic model
This section considers an augmented version of the model with government seignorage
shocks. The stochastic setup facilitates the stability analysis of non-stationary rational
expectations equilibria and helps to put into perspective the role for the elasticity of
labor supply found in the previous section.16
Suppose government seignorage is composed of a ￿xed and a random component
gt = g + vt
16Analysis of non-stationary equilibria in deterministic models can be diﬃcult because variables
may become asymptotically collinear as they settle down to constant values.
18where vt is a white noise shock with zero mean and small bounded support. Real
money then evolves according to the following stochastic law of motion
mt =
mt−1
Πt
+ g + vt (25)
For g>0 n o tt o ol a r g ea n dvt ≡ 0 there are again the two deterministic steady states
(Πn,m n) with n = l,h around which equations (14) and (25) can be linearized:17
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
= α
n + β
n
0Et−1
"
Πt
mt
#
+ β
n
1Et−1
"
Πt+1
mt+1
#
+ δ
n
ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
(26)
The linearization coeﬃcients (αn,βn
0,βn
1,δn) for n = l,h are reported in appendix 8.3,
where it is also shown that the rational expectations solutions of equation (26) have a
minimum state variable representation as an AR(1) process
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
= a + B
ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
(27)
where a is a 2x1 vector and B =( bi,j) a 2x2 matrix with b1,2 6=0 .
In a rational expectations equilibrium the coeﬃcient on lagged money in the in￿a-
tion equation of (27) is never equal to zero, which implies that agents must condition
their in￿ation expectations on lagged money balances if they wish to forecast rationally.
Demand shocks are important for forecasting future in￿ation either because they are
eliminated by an appropriate reaction of in￿ation in the subsequent period or because
they persist into the future where they aﬀect future production costs. With money
balances being permanently shocked, their importance for predicting in￿ation does not
vanish over time.
I now describe in somewhat greater detail the rational expectations equilibria (REE)
for the linearized stochastic model. The claims below are made precise in appendix
8.3.2.
In the neighborhood of the deterministic low in￿ation steady state there exist two
stochastic REE. There is a stochastic steady state denoted by (al,1,Bl,1) a n da ne x p l o -
sive REE denoted by (al,2,Bl,2) where the matrix Bl,2 has an eigenvalue that is larger
than one.
17The linearization uses equation (13) to express the wage expectations in equation (14).
19In the neighborhood of the deterministic high in￿ation steady state there also exist
two stochastic REE. There is again a stochastic steady state denoted by (ah,1,Bh,1)
and an asymptotically stationary REE, denoted by (ah,2,Bh,2). Since the eigenvalues
of Bh,2 are inside the unit circle the mean of this solution converges to the deterministic
high in￿ation steady state.
Therefore, the situation in the stochastic model looks quite similar to that in the
deterministic model. The main diﬀerence is that the equilibrium law of motion for
in￿ation now depends on lagged money balances.
6.1 Expectational Stability of REE
This section analyzes the stability of the REE when agents use least squares estimation
to learn about the parameters (a,B) of the minimum state variable solution (27).
Equation (27) is the simplest equation agents could estimate with the hope of acquiring
rational beliefs in the long run.
The considered least squares learning dynamics can be described as follows. Let
(at−1,B t−1) denote the least squares estimates of (a,B) based on information up to
time t − 1. By the law of iterated expectations, agents￿ forecasts will be given by
Et−1
"
Πt
mt
#
= at−1 + Bt−1
ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
(28)
Et−1
"
Πt+1
mt+1
#
= at−1 + Bt−1
ˆ
at−1 + Bt−1
ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!!
(29)
Inserting these expectations into equation (26) delivers a new data point, which is the
outcome of optimal price setting decisions when expectations are given by (28) and
(29). Using the new data point agents calculate a new least squares estimate (at,B t)
and the process repeats itself.
For a wide range of economic models it has been shown that expectational stability
(E-Stability) of a REE determines whether the least squares estimates (at,B t) locally
converge to their REE-values under least squares learning (Evans and Honkapohja
(1994, 2001)).
E-Stability is de￿ned in terms of the mapping from the Perceived Law of Motion
(PLM), parameterized by (a,B) in (27), to the implied parameters T(a,B) of the
20Actual Law of Motion (ALM). The ALM parameters are obtained by inserting the
expectations (28) and (29) into the model (26), which yields
T(a,B)=
¡
(α + β0a + β1a + β1Ba),(β0B + β1B
2 + δ)
¢
(30)
E-Stability of a REE is then determined by the local stability properties of the ordinary
diﬀerential equation
d
dτ
(a,B)=T(a,B) − (a,B) (31)
a tt h eR E E - v a l u e so f(a,B),w h e r eτ denotes notional or virtual time.
The following proposition reports the E-Stability properties for the REE of the
model. The proof can be found in appendix 8.3.3.
Proposition 2 There exists a level of government expenditures g>0 such that for all
levels 0 ≤ g<g the following holds.
For the linearization at the deterministic low in￿ation steady state
￿ the stochastic steady state (al,1,Bl,1) is E-stable,
￿ the explosive solution (al,2,Bl,2) is E-unstable,
For the linearization at the deterministic high in￿ation steady state
￿ the stochastic steady state (ah,1,Bh,1) is E-unstable,
￿ the asymptotically stationary solution (ah,2,Bh,2) is E-unstable.
The proposition shows that the stochastic low in￿ation steady state is the only
E-stable REE. Again, this holds independent of the degree of imperfect competition.
Furthermore, the low in￿ation stochastic steady state is now E-stable independent of
the value of the labor supply elasticity. The latter feature emerges because the coef-
￿cient on lagged money in the in￿ation equation is given by 1
ml at this equilibrium,
which implies a unit-elasticity of in￿ation with respect to demand shocks. Conse-
quently, demand shocks are expected to be devaluated by a corresponding amount of
in￿ation in the subsequent period and the labor supply elasticity becomes irrelevant
for entrepreneur￿s price setting behavior.
Given this diﬀerence to the deterministic model the next subsection shows how the
stability conditions for the deterministic and the stochastic model are related to each
other.
216 . 2 R e l a t i o nw i t ht h eD e t e r m i n i s t i cM o d e l
Suppose for a moment agents used least squares to estimate the PLM of the determin-
istic model, i.e.
Πt = a + εt (32)
Clearly, forecasts based on this PLM will never be rational in the presence of demand
shocks. However, the economy can still converge to a ￿restricted perceptions equilib-
rium￿. In such an equilibrium expectations are restricted to be of the form (32) and
minimize the mean-squared forecast error for the ALM (26) generated by the expecta-
tions (32).
Appendix 8.3.4 shows that convergence to a restricted perceptions equilibrium
occurs for the linearization at the deterministic low in￿ation steady state whenever
εn,w > 1
2, which is precisely the stability condition of corollary 2. Moreover, the result-
ing restricted perceptions equilibrium converges to the perfect foresight steady state
as the support for the shock vt vanishes. Furthermore, and this is corollary 2, the
restricted perceptions equilibrium is the perfect foresight steady state if the support is
literally zero.
Thus, the PFE analyzed in section 5 is not the limit of the minimum state variable
REE for a vanishing support of the shocks. Instead it is the limit of a restricted
perceptions equilibrium. The stability conditions for restricted perceptions equilibria
need not be identical to those of the REE, as has been noted by Evans and Honkapohja
(2001,chapter 13) in a more simple setting.
The previous ￿ndings also help to interpret the results of Van Zandt and Lettau
(2002) whose stability reversals are obtained (mainly) for constant gain learning rules
in a deterministic model.18 A constant gain rule with a gain that is bounded from
zero would never converge to a rational expectations equilibrium in a stochastic en-
vironment. This suggests that their stability conditions do not capture the stability
properties of a rational expectations equilibrium in a stochastic version of their model
but rather the stability properties to some other equilibrium, as is the case with the
perfect foresight equilibria in this paper.
18For the cases where reversals are reported for decreasing gain learning rules re-interpretation as
constant gain rules is possible as also argued by these authors.
227 Conclusions
This paper has shown that price stickiness helps to obtain a unique temporary equilib-
rium in models where informational consistency requires that agents can use current
prices to update their expectations. Price stickiness thereby permits to study the
stability of rational expectations equilibria under learning dynamics in a rigorous way.
The main result for the overlapping generations model is that, independent of the
degree of imperfect competition, the determinate monetary steady state is the unique
stable equilibrium. However, the paper has also shown that stability properties might
diﬀer between deterministic and stochastic models since there might be a discontinuity
at the zero variance for shocks. In the present case this discontinuity emerged be-
cause the equilibrium law of motion for in￿ation for the deterministic economy was
considerably simpler than the equilibrium law for a stochastic economy with vanishing
noise.
This latter ￿nding is interesting because it illustrates that agents who do not start
out by estimating a forecasting equation whose structure is consistent with the ratio-
nal expectations solution might either learn a diﬀerent equilibrium, e.g. a restricted
perceptions equilibrium, or aﬀect the stability of the economy. After all, it is a rather
strong assumption to postulate that agents learn about a model that is consistent with
the law of motion of the economy once learning is complete.
A natural step to take is to study models where agents must learn not only about
the parameterization of a given model but also about which model to use for learning.
In Adam (2002) I have studied some of the implications of learning about forecast
models but further research in this area would be most welcome.
238 Appendix
8.1 Regularity Condition
Condition 2 At a stationary rational expectations equilibrium (Π,m)
w1
1 − σ
m
Π2 6=
w2
1 − σ
Π − 1
Π
w1
1 − σ
m
Π2 6=
Π +1
Π
γt 6=
m
Π2
w1
1 − σ
−
1
Π
∀ t
where
w1 =
∂w
δn
(m,Π) and w2 =
∂w
∂ t−1Πe
t+1
(m,Π)
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting (14) into (17) and using (13) and (21) delivers:
tΠ
e
t+1 = t−1Π
e
t + γt (M(t−1Π
e
t,m t−1) − t−1Π
e
t) with (33)
M(t−1Π
e
t,m t−1) ≡ t−1Π
e
t
w
‡
mt−1
t−1Πe
t + g, t−1Πe
t
·
1 − σ
(34)
The equation above describes the new in￿ation expectations as a function of past
expectations and past real money holdings. Real money evolves according to
mt =
mt−1
M(t−1Πe
t,m t−1)
+ g (35)
Linearizing (33) and (35) around a steady state (Π,m) yields
ˆ
θ1,t
θ2,t
!
= A(γt)
ˆ
θ1,t−1
θ2,t−1
!
+
ˆ
γtr1,t
r2,t
!
(36)
where
θ1,t = tΠ
e
t+1 − Π
θ2,t = mt − m
are the deviations from the equilibrium values, the ri,t are second order approximation
errors, and A(γt) is a 2x2 matrix given by
A(γt)=
ˆ
1+γt(M1(Π,m) − 1) γtM2(Π,m)
− m
Π2M1(Π,m) 1
Π − m
Π2M2(Π,m)
!
24where Mi is the partial derivative of M with respect to the i-th argument.
The eigenvalues of A(0) are given by
λ1 =1
λ2 =
1
Π
−
m
Π2
ω1
(1 − σ)
and the eigenvalues of A(γt) by
λ1,t = λ1 +
∂λ1
∂γ
γt + O(γ
2
t) (37)
λ2,t = λ2 +
∂λ2
∂γ
γt + O(γ
2
t) (38)
where the last terms are second order approximation errors.
If condition (22) holds, then |λ2| < 1. The regularity condition 2 implies
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂λ2
∂γ
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ < ∞
at γ =0 .T h u s ,|λ2,t| < 1 for small enough γt. Next, consider the eigenvalue λ1,t.U s e
the characteristic polynomial of A(γ) given by
P(A(γ),λ)=( A11(γ) − λ)(A22(γ) − λ) − A12(γ)A21(γ)
where the Aij(γ) denote the matrix entries of A(γ). Then apply the implicit function
theorem to obtain ∂λ1
∂γ at γ =0 ,λ = λ1 =1:
∂λ1
∂γ
= −
∂P(A(γ),λ)/∂γ
∂P(A(γ),λ)/∂λ
=
1
1−σ
¡
w2(Π − 1) − w1
m
Π
¢
1 − λ2
Condition (22) implies that ∂λ1
∂γ < 0 and thereby |λ1,t| < 1 for small enough γt.T h u s ,
(22) implies that both eigenvalues of A(γt) are within the unit circle for γt suﬃciently
small. Otherwise, at least one eigenvalue lies outside the unit circle. This establishes
the stability and instability claims for the constant gain learning rules.
Below I consider the case of decreasing gain learning rules. The proof for the
decreasing gain rules is complicated by the fact that the diﬀerence equation (36) is
non-autonomous and that one of the eigenvalues of A(γt) converges to 1 as γt → 0.
The proof uses similar techniques as Evans and Honkapohja (2000) who treat a simpler
general setup. The main diﬀerence to Evans and Honkapohja is that the current setting
contains a state variable (θ2,t) that is not a belief and therefore does not contain a gain
sequence converging to zero.
25The function M(•,•) as de￿ned in (34) is continuously diﬀerentiable in both argu-
ments in a neighborhood of θ =( 0 ,0). Therefore, for all K1 > 0 and K2 > 0 with
K1 and K2 arbitrarily small there exists a neighborhood to (0,0) where the absolute
values of the approximation errors in (36) are bounded by
|r1,t| ≤ K1 (|θ1,t−1| + |θ2,t−1|) (39a)
|r2,t| ≤ K2 (|θ1,t−1| + |θ2,t−1|) (39b)
Next, consider the eigenvectors e1 and e2 of A(0) corresponding to the eigenvectors λ1
and λ2, respectively:
e1 =
ˆ
e11
1
!
=


1− 1
Π+ m
Π2 M2
− m
Π2 M1
1


e2 =
ˆ
e21
1
!
=
ˆ
0
1
!
The eigenvectors e1,t and e2,t of A(γt) corresponding to the eigenvalues λ1,t and λ2,t,
respectively, are given by
e1,t =
ˆ
e11,t
1
!
=


λ1,t− 1
Π+ m
Π2 M2
− m
Π2 M1
1


e2,t =
ˆ
e21,t
1
!
=


λ2,t− 1
Π+ m
Π2 M2
− m
Π2 M1
1


Now consider the vector base consisting of the eigenvectors (e1,t,e 2,t) of A(γt).L e tt h e
vector (θ1,θ2) have representation (ρ1,ρ2)γt with this new base, i.e.
ˆ
θ1
θ2
!
=( e1,t,e 2,t)
ˆ
ρ1
ρ2
!
γt
(40)
where the subscript γt indicates the base to which the coordinates refer. Then from
(36)
ˆ
ρ1,t
ρ2,t
!
γt
=
ˆ
λ1,t 0
0 λ2,t
!ˆ
ρ1,t−1
ρ2,t−1
!
γt
+
ˆ
s1,t
s2,t
!
γt
(41)
where the approximation errors are given by
ˆ
s1,t
s2,t
!
γt
=
ˆ
1
e11,t−e21,t(γtr1,t − e21,tr2,t)
1
e11,t−e21,t(−γtr1,t + e11,tr2,t)
!
γt
26Using (39a), (39b), and (40) the approximation errors can be bounded as follows:
|s1,t| ≤
1
|e11,t − e21,t|
(γt |r1,t| + |e21,t||r2,t|)
≤
1
|e11,t − e21,t|
(γtK1 + |e21,t|K2)((|θ1,t−1| + |θ2,t−1|))
=
1
|e11,t − e21,t|
(γtK1 + |e21,t|K2)(|ρ1,t−1e11,t + ρ2,t−1e21,t| + |ρ1,t−1 + ρ2,t−1|)
≤
1
|e11,t − e21,t|
(γtK1 + |e21,t|K2)(|ρ1,t−1|(|e11,t| +1 )+|ρ2,t−1|(|e21,t| +1 ) )
Since limt→∞ |e11,t − e21,t| > 0, |e21,t| ∼ O(γt), and since K1 and K2 can be made
arbitrarily small it follows that
|s1,t| ≤ γtK
0
1(|ρ1,t−1| + |ρ2,t−1|) (42)
for some K0
1 > 0 that can also be made arbitrarily small by considering a suﬃciently
small neighborhood around the steady state. Similarly,
|s2,t| ≤
1
|e11,t − e21,t|
(γt |r1,t| + |e11,t||r2,t|)
≤
1
|e11,t − e21,t|
(γtK1 + |e11,t|K2)(|ρ1,t−1|(|e11,t| +1 )+|ρ2,t−1|(|e21,t| +1 ) )
≤ K
0
2(|ρ1,t−1| + |ρ2,t−1|) (43)
for some K0
2 > 0 arbitrarily small.
An inconvenient feature of (41) is that the coordinates are expressed in terms of a
diﬀerent vector base for each γt. Therefore, I rewrite (41) with coordinates from the
vector base (e1,e 2).T h i sb a s ei sa l m o s ti d e n t i c a lt ot h eb a s e(e1,t,e 2,t) for small γt.
Let (ρ1,ρ2)γt have representation (α1,α2)0 with base (e1,e 1), i.e.
ˆ
α1
α2
!
0
=
ˆ
a11,t a12,t
a21,t a22,t
!ˆ
ρ1
ρ2
!
γt
=( e1,e2)
−1 (e1,t,e 2,t)
ˆ
ρ1
ρ2
!
γt
=
ˆ
e11,t
e11
e21,t
e11
1 −
e11,t
e11 1 −
e21,t
e11
!ˆ
ρ1
ρ2
!
γt
(44)
27or conversely
ˆ
ρ1
ρ2
!
γt
=
ˆ
b11,t b12,t
b21,t b22,t
!ˆ
α1
α2
!
0
=
ˆ
e11−e21,t
e11,t−e21,t −
e21,t
e11,t−e21,t
e11,t−e11
e11,t−e21,t
e11,t
e11,t−e21,t
!ˆ
α1
α2
!
0
(45)
One can express the bound on the approximation error in (42) in new coordinates
|s1,t| ≤ γtK
0
1(|b11,tα1,t−1 + b12,tα2,t−1| + |b21,tα1,t−1 + b22,tα2,t−1|)
≤ γtK
0
1 ((|b11,t| + |b21,t|)|α1,t−1| +( |b12,t| + |b22,t|)|α2,t−1|)
≤ γtK
00
1 (|α1,t−1| + |α2,t−1|) (46)
for K00
1 > 0 and arbitrarily small for a suﬃciently small neighborhood. Similarly for
the bound in (43)
|s2,t| ≤ K
00
2(|α1,t−1| + |α2,t−1|) (47)
with K00
2 > 0, arbitrarily small. From (41), (44), and (45)
α1,t = a11,tρ1,t + a12,tρ2,t
= a11,t(λ1,tρ1,t−1 + s1,t)+a12,t((λ2ρ2,t−1 + s2,t)
= a11,t(λ1,t(b11,tα1,t−1 + b12,tα2,t−1)+s1,t)
+ a12,t(λ2,t (b21,tα1,t−1 + b22,tα2,t−1)+s2,t)
=( a11,tλ1,tb11,t + a12,tλ2,tb21,t)α1,t−1
+( a11,tλ1,tb12,t + a12,tλ2,tb22,t)α2,t−1 + a11,ts1,t + a12,ts2,t (48)
and similarly
α2,t =( a21,tλ1,tb11,t + a22,tλ2,tb21,t)α1,t−1
+( a21,tλ1,tb12,t + a22,tλ2,tb22,t)α2,t−1 + a21,ts1,t + a22,ts2,t (49)
Using (46), (47), and (48) one can construct upper and lower bounds for |α1,t| :
|α1,t| ≤ |(a11,tλ1,tb11,t + a12,tλ2,tb21,t)||α1,t−1|
+ |(a11,tλ1,tb12,t + a12,tλ2,tb22,t)||α2,t−1| + |a11,t||s1,t| + |a12,t||s2,t|
≤ (|(a11,tλ1,tb11,t + a12,tλ2,tb21,t)| + γt |a11,t|K
00
1 + |a12,t|K
00
2 )|α1,t−1|
+( |(a11,tλ1,tb12,t + a12,tλ2,tb22,t)| + γt |a11,t|K
00
1 + |a12,t|K
00
2 )|α2,t−1|
28Note that the terms a12,t, b12,t, and b21,t are of order O(γt). Moreover, using a Taylor
series expansion
a11,tλ1,tb11,t =
￿
1+C
∂λ1
∂γ
γt + O(γ
2
t)
¶￿
1+
∂λ1
∂γ
γt + O(γ
2
t)
¶￿
1 − C
∂λ1
∂γ
γt + O(γ
2
t)
¶
=1+
∂λ1
∂γ
γt + O(γ
2
t)
Therefore
|α1,t| ≤ (1 + γtV11)|α1,t−1| + γtV12 |α2,t−1|
where V12 > 0 and V11 o ft h es a m es i g na s∂λ1
∂γ .A l s oV11 and can be made arbitrarily
close to ∂λ1
∂γ by choosing a suﬃciently small neighborhood.
Al o w e rb o u n df o r|α1,t| is given by
|α1,t| ≥ |(a11,tλ1,tb11,t + a12,tλ2,tb21,t)||α1,t−1|
− |(a11,tλ1,tb12,t + a12,tλ2,tb22,t)||α2,t−1| − |a11,t||s1,t| − |a12,t||s2,t|
≥ (|(a11,tλ1,tb11,t + a12,tλ2,tb21,t)| − γt |a11,t|K
00
1 − |a12,t|K
00
2 )|α1,t−1|
− (|(a11,tλ1,tb12,t + a12,tλ2,tb22,t)| + γt |a11,t|K
00
1 + |a12,t|K
00
2 )|α2,t−1|
≥ (1 + γtW11)|α1,t−1| − γtW12 |α2,t−1|
with W12 > 0 and W11 of the same sign and arbitrarily close to ∂λ1
∂γ ,b yt h es a m e
arguments as above.
Next use (46), (47), and (49) to get bounds for |α2,t| :
|α2,t| ≤ (|(a21,tλ1,tb11,t + a22,tλ2,tb21,t)| + γt |a21,t|K
00
1 + |a22,t|K
00
2 )|α1,t−1|
+( |(a21λ1,tb12,t + a22,tλ2,tb22,t)| + γt |a21,t|K
00
1 + |a22,t|K
00
2 )|α2,t−1|
Since a21,t,b 12,t,a n db21,t are of order O(γt)
|α2,t| ≤ V21 |α1,t−1| + V22 |α2,t−1|
with V21 > 0, V22 > 0. Moreover,by choosing a suﬃciently small neighborhood and a t
large enough one can choose V21 arbitrarily close to zero. Also, since
lima22,t =l i mb22,t =1
one can choose V22 < 1 when |λ2| < 1 and V22 > 1 when |λ2| > 1 for all t suﬃciently
large and all suﬃciently small neighborhoods.
29Al o w e rb o u n df o r|α2,t| is given by
|α2,t| ≥−(|(a21,tλ1,tb11,t + a22,tλ2,tb21,t)| + γt |a21,t|K
00
1 + |a22,t|K
00
2 )|α1,t−1|
+( |(a21,tλ1,tb12,t + a22,tλ2,tb22,t)| − γt |a21,t|K
00
1 − |a22,t|K
00
2 )|α2,t−1|
≥− W21 |α1,t−1| + W22 |α1,t−1|
with W21 > 0, W22 > 0.B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n t sa sa b o v e ,f o rt suﬃciently large and
as u ﬃciently small neighborhood W22 < 1 if |λ2| < 1 and W22 > 1 if |λ2| > 1.
Collecting the previous bounds we have
Wt
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!
≤
ˆ
|α1,t|
|α2,t|
!
≤ Vt
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!
(50)
where Wt =
ˆ
1+γtW11 −γtW12
−W21 W22
!
Vt =
ˆ
1+γtV11 γtV12
V21 V22
!
where the inequalities should be interpreted component-wise. Now take a time t∗ and
a neighborhood U such that one can choose W22 < 1 (W22 > 1), and V22 < 1( V22 > 1)
if |λ2| < 1( |λ2| > 1).
I now assume (22) holds and will prove the stability part for decreasing gain learning
rules. First, construct a matrix norm k•kh and a compatible vector norm |•|h such that
|Sx|h ≤ kSkh |x|h (51)
for all 2 ￿ 2 matrices S and 2 ￿ 1 vectors x.D e ￿n et h em a t r i xn o r ma sf o l l o w s
kSkh =
￿ ￿DhSD
−1
h
￿ ￿
max with
Dh =
ˆ
h2 0
0 h
!
where k•kmax is the maximum absolute norm de￿ned by kMkmax =m a x i,j |Mi,j|.A
compatible vector norm is given by (see Horn and Johnson (1985), p.297 )
|x|h = k(x,x)kh
where (x,x) is the matrix whose columns consist of the vectors x.
30With these de￿n i t i o n sw eh a v e
kVtkh =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
ˆ
1+γtV11 γthV12
h−1V21 V22
!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
max
Now choose h large enough such that
h
−1V21 <V 22
and a time t∗∗ ≥ t∗ large enough such that for all t ≥ t∗∗
γthV12 <V 22 < 1+γtV11
Then for t ≥ t∗∗
kVtkh =1+γtV11
and by (51)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Vt •
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
h
≤ (1 + γtV11)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
(52)
Since the vector norm |•|h is absolute, i.e.
|x|h = ||x|| h
it follows (from Horn and Johnson (1985), p.285) that it is monotone. From (50) and
(52) we therefore have that
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t|
|α2,t|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
− γtV11
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
≤
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
(53)
Since V11 < 0 when (22) holds, |αt| is a strictly decreasing positive sequence. This
implies that it has a limit α∗ ≥ 0. I now show that α∗ =0 .S u m m i n g t h e l e f t - a n d
right-hand side of equation (53) for t to t + s yields
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t+s|
|α2,t+s|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
− V11
s X
i=0
γt+i
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1+i|
|α2,t−1+i|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
≤
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
Now assume α∗ > 0. Then we can divide the previous expression by the norm of
|αt+s−1|h which together with the fact that |αt|h is decreasing yields
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t+s|
|α2,t+s|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1+s|
|α2,t−1+s|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
− V11
s X
i=0
γt+i ≤
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1|
|α2,t−1|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
ˆ
|α1,t−1+s|
|α2,t−1+s|
!ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
h
31Since
P
t γt = ∞ the left-hand side will increase without bound as s increases. But then
|at−1+s|h must converge to zero, a contradiction. Therefore, limt→∞ |αt|h = α∗ =0 .
This establishes that there exists a neighborhood U of α =( 0 ,0) such that if αt ∈ U
at a time t ≥ t∗∗,t h e nαt → (0,0).B y c o n t i n u i t y o f Mi(•,•) and the fact that (36)
has a ￿xed point at (0,0) for all γt, αt remains in U for t ≤ t∗∗ if the initial values α0
are chosen from another suﬃciently small neighborhood U0 ⊂ U. This establishes the
asymptotic stability result for decreasing gain learning rules.
I now proceed with the instability part of the proposition. When (22) does not hold
then ∂λ1
∂γ > 0,o r|λ2| > 1,o rb o t h .
First suppose |λ2| > 1. Then W22 > 1 for t ≥ t∗. Consider the cone Cβ =
{(α1,α2)||α2| ≥ β |α1|}. I will show that there exists a ￿nite time t∗∗ ≥ t∗ and a
neighborhood U0 ⊂ U such that if αt ∈ Cβ ∩ U0 at a time t ≥ t∗∗,i tf o l l o w st h a t
αt+1 ∈ Cβ. In other words, αt must leave U0 before it can leave Cβ.
From (50) we have that for αt ∈ Cβ and β large enough
|α2,t+1| − |α2,t| ≥ (−
W21
β
+ W22 − 1)|α2,t| = Z |α2,t| (54)
For β large enough Z>0.A l s of r o m( 5 0 )
|α1,t+1| − |α1,t| ≤ γt+1 (V12 |α1,t| + V22 |α2,t|)
≤ γt+1(
V12
β
+ V22)|α2,t|
Choosing t∗∗ large enough such that for all t ≥ t∗∗
βγt+1(
V12
β
+ V22) <Z
we have
β (|α1,t+1| − |α1,t|) ≤ |α2,t+1| − |α2,t|
From αt ∈ Cβ we have
β |α1,t| ≤ |α2,t|
Adding up the last two equations implies αt+1 ∈ Cβ.
N o wn o t et h a tf r o m( 5 4 )i tf o l l o w st h a tf o rt ≥ t∗∗ and any αt ∈ Cβ ∩ U0 with
α2,t 6=0the sequence {αt+i}
∞
i=1 will leave U0 in ￿nite time.
32It remains to show that for any small neighborhood U00 ⊂ U0 there is a point α0 ∈ U00
that is mapped in a ￿xed number of steps t∗∗ i n t oan o n - z e r op o i n tαt∗∗ ∈ Cβ ∩ U0.
The mapping M(Π,m) as de￿n e di n( 3 4 )i sc o n t i n u o u s l yd i ﬀerentiable for Π > 0.
Furthermore, M(Π,m) > 0 for Π > 0. Since in any stationary rational expectations
equilibrium (Π,m) with g ≥ 0 we have Π ≥ 1, (36) is continuously diﬀerentiable in a
neighborhood of α =( 0 ,0). By the regularity assumptions, the matrices A(γt) are non-
singular. The mapping (36), therefore, ful￿l l st h ea s s u m p t i o n so ft h ei n v e r s ef u n c t i o n
theorem (see e.g. Hirsch and Smale (1974), p.337). Moreover, they have a ￿xed point
at (0,0) for all t. Therefore, the t∗∗-iterative map also ful￿lls the assumptions of the
inverse function theorem and has a ￿xed point at (0,0).N o w￿x an arbitrary U00 ⊂ U0
and choose a αt∗∗ ∈ Cβ ∩ U00 with |α1,t∗| and |α2,t∗| suﬃciently small. Then by the
continuous diﬀerentiability of the t∗∗-iterative map and the ￿xed point property, the
pre-image (θ0,ρ0) must be in U00. But I have shown that from t∗∗ onwards one obtains
a divergent trajectory.
Next, suppose ∂λ1
∂γ > 1 and without loss of generality |λ2| < 1.T h e nW11 > 0 and
V22 < 1 for t ≥ t∗.D e ￿ne the cone C0
β = {(α1,α2)||α1| ≥ β |α2|}.W i t hαt ∈ Cβ ∩ U
equation (50) implies for t ≥ t∗
|α1,t+1| − |α1,t| ≥ (γt+1W11 |α1,t| − γt+1W12 |α2,t| )
≥ γt+1
￿
W11 −
W12
β
¶
|α1,t| (55)
Similarly, (50) implies
β (|α2,t+1| − |α2,t|) ≤ β (V21 |α1,t| +( V22 − 1))|α2,t|
≤ (βV21 +( V22 − 1))|α1,t| (56)
Now choose a β such that
￿
W11 −
W12
β
¶
> 0 (57)
This implies that |α1,t| is increasing in C0
β ∩ U.
Restricting consideration to a suﬃciently small neighborhood U0 ⊂ U one can
choose V21 arbitrarily close to zero and V22 arbitrarily close to |λ2| < 1.W i t h a
suﬃciently small U0 it holds that
(βV21 +( V22 − 1)) < 0
33and |α2,t| is decreasing in C
0
β ∩U0.T h i si m p l i e st h a tαt+1 ∈ C0
β whenever αt ∈ C
0
β ∩U0
for t ≥ t∗.A s b e f o r e , αt must leave U0 before it can leave C
0
β. At the same time
(55),(57), and the fact that
P
γt = ∞ imply that αt will leave U0 in ￿nite time. Then
choosing an αt∗ ∈ C
0
β ∩ U00 suﬃciently close to zero will insure that the pre-image α0
of αt∗will be from any arbitrarily small neighborhood U00 ⊂ U0.B u tf r o mt∗∗ onwards
one gets a divergent trajectory.
8.3 Appendix to Section 6
8.3.1 Linearization Coeﬃcients
For g =0 ,t h ec o e ﬃcient matrices around the low in￿ation equilibrium (Πl,m l)a r e
given by
α
l =
ˆ
−
wl
2
1−σ
ml(1 +
wl
2
1−σ)
!
(58a)
β
l
0 =
ˆ
1 −
mlwl
1
1−σ 0
−ml +
¡
ml¢2 wl
1
1−σ 0
!
(58b)
β
l
1 =
ˆ
wl
2
1−σ 0
−ml wl
2
1−σ 0
!
(58c)
δ
l =
ˆ
0
wl
1
1−σ
01 − ml wl
1
1−σ
!
(58d)
where
w
l
1 =
∂w
∂nt
(m
l,Π
l) and w
l
2 =
∂w
∂Et−1[Πt]
(m
l,Π
l)
Similarly, the coeﬃcients for the high in￿ation equilibrium (Πh,m h)a tg =0are given
by
α
h =
ˆ
−
¡
Πh¢2 wh
2
1−σ
0
!
(59a)
β
h
0 =
ˆ
10
00
!
(59b)
β
h
1 =
ˆ
Πh wh
2
1−σ 0
00
!
(59c)
δ
h =
ˆ
0
wh
1
1−σ
0 1
Πh
!
(59d)
34where wh
1 and wh
2 are now evaluated at (mh,Πh).
8.3.2 Minimum State Variable Solutions
Consider a stochastic linear expectational diﬀerence equation of the form
xt = k + B0Et−1 [xt]+B1Et−1 [xt+1]+Dxt−1 + ut (60)
with xt,u t,k∈ Rn,B 0,B 1,D∈ Rn￿n, and B1 6=0 ,D6=0 . The minimum state variable
solutions of (60) take the form
xt = a + Bxt−1 + ut
provided there exists a real solution to the matrix quadratic equation
B1B
2 − (B0 − I)B + D =0 (61)
see chapter 10 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Then a is given by
(I − B0 − B1(1 + B))a − k =0 (62)
The minimum state variable rational expectations solutions can be calculated by
solving the matrix equations (61) for B a n dt h e nu s i n g( 6 2 )t oc a l c u l a t ea where
k,B1,B 2,a n dD are given by the linearization coeﬃcients in appendix 8.3.1. Some
lengthy algebra shows that around the low in￿ation steady state (Πl,m l) there are two
AR(1) rational expectations solutions given by
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
= a
l,1 + B
l,1
ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
=
ˆ
0
ml
!
+
ˆ
0 1
ml
00
!ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
and
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
= a
l,2 + B
l,2
ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
=
ˆ
1+ml w1
l
w2l
−
¡
ml¢2 w1
l
w2l
!
+
ˆ
0 −w1
l
w2l
01 + ml w1
l
w2l
!ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
With the eigenvalues of Bl,1 being equal to zero, this solution is stationary. However,
since ml wl
1
wl
2 > 0 the solution
¡
al,2,Bl,2¢
has an eigenvalue large than one, which implies
that it is explosive.
35Around the high in￿ation steady state (Πh,m h) there is a single AR(1) rational
expectations solution given by
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
= a
h,2 + B
h,2
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
=
ˆ
Πh
0
!
+
ˆ
0 −
wh
1
wh
2
0 1
Πh
!ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
Since Πh > 1 the eigenvalues of Bh,2 are inside the unit circle, which implies that
the solution is asymptotically stationary. For g>the linearization coeﬃcients around
(Πh(g),m h(g)) are given by
α
h =
ˆ
−
¡
Πh¢2 wh
2
1−σ
mh + mhw2
(1−σ)
!
(63a)
β
h
0 =


1 −
mhwh
1
Πh(1−σ) 0
− mh
(Πh)
2 + (mh)
2
wh
1
(Πh)
3
(1−σ) 0

 (63b)
β
h
1 =
ˆ
Πh wh
2
1−σ 0
−
mhwh
2
Πh(1−σ) 0
!
(63c)
δ
h =


0
wh
1
1−σ
0 1
Πh − mhw1
(Πh)
2
(1−σ)

 (63d)
and there exists another rational expectations solution, which ceases to exist at g =0 :
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
= a
h,1 + B
h,1
ˆ
Πt
mt
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
=
ˆ
0
mh
!
+
ˆ
0 Πh
mh
00
!ˆ
Πt−1
mt−1
!
+
ˆ
0
vt
!
Since both eigenvalues of Bh,1 are equal to zero this solution is stationary.
8.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The diﬀerential equation (31) is stable (unstable) at some REE (a∗,B∗) if all eigenvalues
(some eigenvalue) of
∂vec(T(a,B))
∂vec(a,B)
36at (a,B)=( a∗,B∗) are smaller than one (is larger than one), where vec(•) denotes the
(columnwise) vectorization operator. Let
T(a,B)=( T
a(a,B),T
B(a,B))
where Ta denotes the implied ALM for a,a n dTB the ALM for B.S i n c eTB(a,B) is
independent of a, see (30), one has to consider only the eigenvalues of
∂ vecTB(B)
∂ vecB and
∂Ta(a,B)
∂a . The following table lists the eigenvalues of these two matrices for the respective
rational expectations solutions at g =0 :19
RE-Solution EV￿s of
∂ vecTB(B)
∂ vecB EV￿s of
∂Ta(a,B)
∂a
al,1,Bl,1 λ1 = λ2 =0 ,λ3 = λ4 =1−
wl
2
1−σ − ml wl
1
1−σ λ5 =0 ,λ6 =1− ml wl
1
1−σ
al,2,Bl,2 λ1 = λ2 =0 ,λ3 =1 ,λ4 =1+
wl
2
1−σ + ml wl
1
1−σ λ5 =0 ,λ6 =1+wl
2
ah,1,Bh,1 λ1 = λ2 =0 ,λ3 = λ4 =1 λ5 =0 ,λ6 =1+( Πh − 1)
wh
2
1−σ
ah,2,Bh,2 λ1 = λ2 =0 ,λ3 =1 ,λ4 =1+
wh
2
1−σ λ5 =0 ,λ6 =1+Πh wh
2
1−σ
Since wn
1 > 0, wn
2 > 0 for n = l,h and Πh > 1, it follows that the rational expectations
solution (al,1,Bl,1) is E-stable and the solutions (al,2,Bl,2), (ah,1,Bh,1) and (ah,2,Bh,2)
are E-unstable.
8.3.4 The Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium
Suppose agents forecast using the PLM (32), which implies Et−1(Πt)=Et−1(Πt+1)=
at−1,w h e r eat−1 is the t−1 estimate of a. For given at−1 = a the implied ALM (26) is
stationary for the linearization coeﬃcients (58) at the low in￿ation steady state if and
only if
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ1 − ml wl
1
1−σ
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ < 1.S i n c e ml > 0, wl
1 > 0,a n dσ ∈ (0,1) this is the case if and
only if εn,w > 1
2. Provided the elasticity condition holds the mapping from the PLM
to the ALM, T(a), is given by the projection of the ALM (26) with expectations given
by a onto the PLM (32), i.e. T(a)=E(Π(a)). F r o m( 2 6 )i tf o l l o w st h a tT(a)=1 .
Therefore the stochastic diﬀerential equation determining E-stability of the restricted
perceptions equilibrium
da
dτ
= T(a) − a =1− a
has a unique ￿xed point at a =1(the low steady state in￿ation rate) which is always E-
stable (provided εn,w > 1
2). It follows that the ALM (26) with Et−1(Πt)=Et−1(Πt+1)=
1 ￿uctuates around the perfect foresight steady state with deviations from it converging
to zero as the support of the shock vt vanishes.
19For the solution (ah,1,Bh,1) it lists the limits of the eigenvalues for g → 0.
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